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Rediscovering the Core
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ARTICLES:
contd..
PEACE
INTO PIECES : WHAT GOVERNMENT OUGHT TO DO
That
time the preparation was more comprehensive—and at least it had
the blessings of ULFA chairman Aurobindo Rajkhowa although the Commander
in chief finally prevailed over. Since then, the Government was
successful in dividing the organization horizontally but question
arises at what cost? The society and the Government had to pay a
heavy price in terms of criminalizing and weaponising the society
---as SULFA had become law unto themselves.
The division of organizations were also attempted in Nagaland. Indian
State in its quest for gaining ground in Nagaland could bring a
sizeable number of under ground rebels to the signing of an accord,
which is known as the Shillong Accord of 1975. The Shillong Accord
was rejected by Phizo and it created divisions within the Naga National
Council ( NNC). Two leaders of the NNC Thuengaling Muivah and Isak
Sui felt that the NNC ‘isolated itself from the people’ Thus to
save people from the ‘process of domination, exploitation and assimilation’
the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN) was formed. During
this period Khaplang , a Hemi Konyak Naga of Burma was the president
of rebel Federal Government. Both Muivah and Swu were able to win
over khaplang. A new Government of the peoples Republic of Nagaland
with Isak Swu as the president, Khaplang as the Vice-Chairman and
Muivah as the general secretary was declared elected. It declares
its objectives as follows: (i) the unquestionable sovereign rights
of the Naga people over every inch of Nagaland. (ii) Dictatorship
of the people through the NSCN and the practice of Democracy…as
long as it is deemed necessary. (iii) The faith in God and salvation
of mankind in Jesus Christ, that is, Nagaland for Christ. (iv) Rules
out saving Nagaland through peaceful means.
The argument that we are trying to make is –peace always looks more
sustaining and lasting when it has the blessings of the whole organizations—particularly
its leaderships. In both the occasions mentioned above ( also applicable
in case of DHD-Garlosa) –the Governments could attain partial peace
temporarily but very soon the left out parent wings or the new outfits
created out of the old debris had become more dangerous –and hit
back government with vengeance. ULFA became more dangerous after
1991 and the division by Hiteswar Saikia could hardly weaken the
organization. The Naga struggle became more intensive after the
formation of NSCN its division later on notwithstanding! It has
become communal as they have now avowedly become Christian replacing
a secular NNC. The DHD Garlosa or the Black widow is a more dangerous
wing now.
Factional peace process will usher a perpetual fratricidal war which
is relatively absent in Assam except those killing at the behest
of SULFA. In Nagaland –in last two months more than forty Nagas
have laid lives at such killings among NSCN—I-M, Khaplnag and new
faction called NSCN (Unification). The Bodos are killing themselves.
And now the cadres of ULFA will kill themselves—in other words more
Assamese will be killed making the task easier for the Security
experts.
On top of all in the post –factional peace process -the organizations
become more integrated into global terrorist network and this time
the terrorist strike in Assam could witness more fatalistic strike
as the frustrated leaders would possibly engage mercenaries and
radical fundamentalist who would be willing to kill and get killed
for martyrdom. At this stage insurgency no longer remains a dependent
variable ----it becomes an independent variable. It finds its own
logic, clientele. Establishment of peace with the insurgent groups
must involve the top leaders as such organizations are more leader-centric.
Three things are required to tackle insurgency—political strategy,
policy and policing. Unfortunately it is the policing that have
been attempting the peace process in Assam---bypassing both political
strategy and policy. The political leaders must understand that
‘a heart and mind approach’ always work better than the impersonal
‘Sam, Dam, Danda, Bhed approach’. Here we must learn from Indira
Gandhi who took all the initiative to settle the Mizo insurgency
since 1975. If we plan to settle insurgency by strict norms (like
–no third party mediation, surrender first, confining cadres to
the camp and must accept Indian constitution first— kind of conditionalities)–Peace
(which we unfortunately understand as the absence of violence) would
never come. Such tactics were/are not in operation with Kashmir,
Mizo, Naga or Bodo peace process.
We can’t resolve insurgency by a typical Weberian legal rational
framework ------we may curse insurgents as the fundamentalist, alienated
, frustrated lot but ultimately it’s through persuasion, concession,
reward, Dialogue and political will that can resolve it. A clarion
call to both ULFA and the Indian State ---Why not adopt the formula
that we have been adopting with Mizos, Nagas and the Kashmiris—i.e.—
1st—Create an atmosphere like--release the leaders (In any case
Government has to release them sooner or later—a few are already
in bail),
2nd, let GOI declare its emissary (like Mr Padmanabhaiya with the
Nagas and Mr Vohra with the Kashmiris) ,
3rd –Let ULFA contact the emissary (ULFA this time must respond).
The process at least will begin—whether one accepts Indian sovereignty
or not are all meaningless at this level---let us be in table ---rest
will follow. This will work
 
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