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Yet another attempt to bring a section of ULFA to the negotiation table. Attempts to bring a section of ULFA to talks and arrest of ‘hardcore ULFA over ground supporters’, strict imposition of ‘peace rules’ seem to have created confusion among the common people. What if the top leaders of ULFA would not respond to the imposed peace process? Skepticism has occurred because such attempts were made several times. Such an attempt was made in 1975 with one faction of Naga National Council; this was also attempted in 1991 with one factions of ULFA (called pro-talk group---euphemistically called ‘Sulfa’ --has any talk placed so far?)—this is also done in Kashmir in the form of ‘Ikanul muslimoon’ ---this is also attempted in Naxal affected areas (such as Chattisgarh) known by a terrifying name called “Salwar Judoom”. They have never seemed to work.

The recent attempt of the Government to bring the most powerful 28th Battalion to peace is again dubbed as the ‘pro-talk’. Such attempts were made in 1991—how did it fare—let us refresh our memory. In the midst of the operations against ULFA, army arrested one of the most important persons of the organization Anup Chetia alias Golap Borbora on the 18th November, 1991. Besides important leaders of the organization such as Manoj Hazarika , Bhaskar Barbarua, Prabhat Barua, Raj Barua and his wife Juli Barua were arrested. On the 31st December 1991 one of most hardcore cadre and deputy commander in Chief of ULFA Hirak Jyoti Mahanta was killed by army. But most of the News papers argue that uncompromising Mahanta was killed by army as he refused to relent after being caught. On the same day stalwarts of the organization like Sunil Nath , Sailen Dutta Konwar, Moon Ali were caught , many argue that they have surrendered. Very soon the foreign secretary of the organization Javed bora, Pradip Gogoi the vice-chairman were also caught. In such situation, the chairman of the organization Aurobinda Rajkhowa wrote a letter to the Prime Minister office urging for talks.

In his secret letter to the Prime Minister he agreed, subject to the ratification of the Central Committee, to accept a solution within the framework of the Indian Constitution, to abjure violence and the surrender of arms at an appropriate time He of course urged the Prime Minister to remove the ban on the organisation, to end army operation and use of sweeping powers of arrest and detention under the Armed Disturbed Areas Act and the Armed forces (Special Powers) Act.Preparation for a breakthrough was made in fact on February 1, 1991 when the General Publicity Secretary Siddhartha Phukan alias Sunil Nath 'on behalf of the Central Council ULFA' addressed to the Governor Devidas Thakur soliciting removal of the President's rule to create a favourable climate to hold discussion. In early January 1992, the ULFA took the initiative with the release of the remaining hostages and its total and indefinite ceasefire'. The negotiations carried on both in Delhi and Dispur paved the way for the talk on 12 January 1992. High officials of the Ministry of Home and Cabinet Secretary apart, the meeting was attended by the Assam Chief Minister and delegation of five headed by the General Secretary Anup Chetia of the United Liberation Front of Assam. The Prime Minister was assured that the insurgents would formally end violence and sought a solution within the framework of Indian Constitution and in return Prime Minister would suspend army operations and the ULFA would have to surrender arms and get necessary clearance from the Central Council for the accord and surrendering the militants. Hiteswar Saikia was advised by the Home Minister S.B. Chavan 'to create an atmosphere conducive to facilitating process of future negotiations' though he had grave doubts as to the bonafides of the ULFA leaders.

A deadlock ensued. No meeting of the Central Council was held to endorse the assurance given by the Chairman Rajkhowa to the Prime Minister on January I nor of the five members delegation of the Delhi talks on January 12. The leaders of the five district units – Kamrup, Barpeta, Sonitpur, Jorhat and Lakhimpur-being tired of insurgency decided to endorse the Delhi talks and come out in favour of the dialogue that began on January 12. As many as eighteen of these members formally met the Chief Minister and senior officials on 31 March. In a statement denouncing the top leaders, then in Bangladesh, for their failure to give proper guidance, they reaffirmed the commitments already made and decided to start direct negotiations with the government. The most delicate task of persuading the hard-core after Delhi talks devolved on the 'trinity' : Chairman Arabinda Rajkhowa, Vice-Chairman Pradip Gogoi and General Anup Chetia. They failed in their mission. The hard-core clung fast to their ultimate goal Swadhin Asom and viewed the talks 'as a continuation of the struggle in another form'. They condemned split in the cadre and expelled the dissidents from primary membership of the organisation. The action of the Chairman was denounced by the Commander-in-Chief Paresh Barua, then in Bangladesh, as 'unacceptable sell out'. A section of the militants resolved not to abandon the path of struggle adopting tactics according to the exigencies of the situation. Of the 'trinity', Chetia and Gogoi, who had been maintaining close links with Delhi disappeared. Rajkhowa being pressurized by Paresh Barna had no option but to make a volte-face and left for Bangladesh with two followers to assure Barua that they had not 'sold out' to ensure their 'political survival and physical well-being.